Turkey’s Black Sea Gas Discovery: A Geo-Economic and Strategic Turning Point

Dr. Asif Nawaz

Assistant Professor

Hamdard Institute of International Studies, Jamia Hamdard, New Delhi

draasifnawaz@gmail.com

+91 9013228794

In a major announcement on Saturday, 17th May 2025, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan revealed that 75 billion cubic meters (bcm) of natural gas have been discovered in the Göktepe field located in the Black Sea. This is not just another energy find—it is a critical development with far-reaching implications for regional geopolitics, energy security, and economic sovereignty.

The latest discovery pushes Turkey’s total offshore natural gas reserves to 710 bcm, placing the country on a new trajectory as a potential energy hub that could rival established players in the Middle East and Eurasia.

Let's explore the significance of this discovery through a multi-layered lens—analyzing its geopolitical, economic, regional, and strategic consequences, with a focused reflection on how India should interpret these developments given its own energy vulnerabilities and complex diplomatic ties with Ankara.

The newly found reserves in the Göktepe field are estimated to be worth around $30 billion, enough to meet Turkey’s household gas demand for 3.5 years. The announcement comes as part of a broader strategy that Turkey has pursued over the past decade to reduce its energy dependence and assert a more autonomous role in global energy markets.

Turkey’s energy exploration ambitions gained serious momentum in August 2020, when it announced a landmark discovery of 320 bcm in the Sakarya gas field, later revised to 405 bcm. In 2021, another 135 bcm were added, and by late 2022, the total stood at 710 bcm, including the latest additions.

For a country that imports over 90% of its energy needs, this transformation from an energy importer to a potential exporter marks a historic shift.

Geopolitical Implications:

Turkey’s rise as a significant gas player could alter traditional energy routes, which have primarily moved from the Middle East and Russia into Europe. With Europe’s urgent need to diversify away from Russian gas—especially in the wake of the Ukraine war—Turkey’s positioning as both a supplier and transit state makes it geopolitically indispensable.

Turkey’s assertiveness in maritime exploration has already led to tensions with Greece, Cyprus, and France, particularly over exclusive economic zones (EEZs) in the Eastern Mediterranean. The new discovery in the Black Sea reinforces Ankara’s maritime doctrine—“Mavi Vatan” or Blue Homeland—which envisions energy sovereignty and control over vast sea territories.

This could trigger new maritime disputes, especially as Ankara seeks to extend pipelines or negotiate export arrangements. Europe’s dependence on alternative gas sources gives Turkey new leverage in these contentious dialogues.

Geographically straddling Europe and Asia, Turkey has long attempted to balance its strategic identity. This energy discovery strengthens its bargaining power with both blocs:

• With Europe: Turkey can become a key route for energy transmission via the Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP) and other corridors.

• With the Middle East: Turkey’s entry into the energy club may challenge Gulf states like Qatar and UAE, while also deepening ties with Azerbaijan and Central Asian producers.

Economic Ramifications for Turkey:

Turkey’s energy import bill stood at around $97 billion in 2022, with natural gas forming a major share. The current account deficit, largely driven by energy, remains a central weakness of the Turkish economy. However, the country’s energy imports in 2024 reached approximately $65.59 billion, marking a 5.1% reduction from the $69.11 billion recorded in 2023. The decline is mainly attributed to increased domestic production, expanded renewable energy capacity, and improved energy efficiency measures.

The Black Sea gas will further significantly reduce external dependency, lower the current account deficit, and reduce inflationary pressure on the Turkish lira, which has faced record lows in recent years.

With domestic energy becoming available at reduced costs, Turkish manufacturing, heavy industry, and agriculture could benefit from more stable and affordable power supplies. Moreover, the investment in exploration and drilling—using Turkey’s own fleet of seismic and drilling vessels—creates new skilled employment opportunities.

Once domestic infrastructure is sufficiently developed, Turkey may become a re-exporter of gas, especially to European countries in urgent need of alternative sources post-Russia. This not only brings foreign exchange earnings but also political capital in EU corridors.

West Asia and Turkey’s Rising Leverage:

Turkey’s new gas wealth allows it to bargain independently in the Middle East without being economically beholden to Gulf suppliers. Ankara can now pursue a more confident foreign policy in Syria, Iraq, Libya, and Palestine—regions where its military, humanitarian, and political interests are expanding.

Turkey’s new status could enhance relations with Azerbaijan, with whom Turkey shares both ethnic and strategic ties via the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan and TANAP pipelines. It could alsp create friction with Egypt, Israel, and Greece, especially over exploration zones in Eastern Mediterranean. It will also position Ankara as an alternative partner to both the West and Russia in a rapidly shifting energy diplomacy landscape.

What India Should Be Watching: 

India consumed 63.9 bcm of natural gas in FY 2022–23. In the fiscal year 2023–24, India’s natural gas consumption increased to approximately 66.6 billion cubic meters (bcm), marking a 4.2% year-on-year growth, and this is projected to exceed 100 bcm by 2030 as part of its clean energy transition. However, the country is heavily reliant on imports, meeting over 50% of its demand through LNG imports.

According to data from the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas: In the fiscal year 2023–24, India’s liquefied natural gas (LNG) imports increased significantly, reaching approximately 36 billion cubic meters (bcm), up from 22.5 bcm in FY 2022–23.  This surge underscores India’s growing reliance on LNG to meet its energy demands. Regarding the sources of these imports, the Middle East remained a dominant supplier of more than 50%. In 2023, Qatar accounted for 50% of India’s LNG imports, followed by the United States at 14%, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) at 12%, and Oman at 4%. Looking ahead, India’s LNG demand is projected to grow steadily, reaching 64 bcm per year by 2030, driven by the government’s goal to increase the share of natural gas in the energy mix from the current 6.2% to 15%.  This anticipated growth highlights the importance of expanding import infrastructure and securing long-term and diversified supply agreements to ensure energy security. Moreover, with volatile prices and increasing global competition for LNG, India’s energy security remains vulnerable.

India's Challenging Diplomatic Equations with Turkey:

India and Turkey have historically maintained civil but uneven and periodically tense diplomatic relations, which have taken a more confrontational turn in recent years due to deep disagreements over Kashmir, Pakistan, and the evolving geopolitical alignments in West and South Asia.  At the heart of the strained ties lies Turkey’s repeated and vocal support for Pakistan on the Kashmir issue. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has consistently raised Kashmir at international platforms, including in UN General Assembly Speeches (2019–2023) and OIC (Organisation of Islamic Cooperation) Summits, supporting resolutions that back Pakistan’s narrative on Kashmir. alongside China and Malaysia, Turkiye  also supported Pakistan’s diplomatic efforts to avoid blacklisting by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), despite India’s push for stricter scrutiny of Pakistan’s alleged terror financing links.

This consistent international lobbying against Indian interests has triggered sharp diplomatic responses from New Delhi, with India characterizing Turkey’s remarks as interference in its internal affairs.

Beyond rhetoric, Turkey’s growing military cooperation with Pakistan has been a major concern for India, which includes Joint military training exercises between Turkish and Pakistani forces, Turkish aerospace firm Baykar’s drone exports to Pakistan, particularly the Bayraktar TB2 drones, which have been seen as a force multiplier in regional asymmetrical warfare, Naval cooperation through the joint development of MILGEM-class corvettes (a Turkish design) for the Pakistani Navy and Intelligence-sharing mechanisms and increased defense dialogues under the ambit of a broader Islamic defense alliance. 

These developments have made Ankara an increasingly prominent player in India’s western strategic theatre, and potentially a complicating factor in India’s defense calculus vis-à-vis Pakistan.

These geopolitical tensions spill over into the economic and energy domain. Turkey, with its growing energy potential—especially after recent Black Sea gas discoveries—is positioning itself as a future re-exporter or transit hub for natural gas to Europe and beyond.

However, given the current frosty diplomatic atmosphere between India and Turkiye, India is unlikely to pursue any significant bilateral energy cooperation with Turkiye, despite its aggressive efforts to diversify LNG imports. As of now India imports no natural gas directly from Turkiye. There are no active energy MoUs or pipelines of commercial energy cooperation between the two nations. Indian firms have not invested in Turkiye’s upstream energy sector, even as global interest grows in the Black Sea region.

Yet, from a strategic perspective, India should not afford to ignore Turkey’s evolving energy role—especially if Ankara begins to emerge as a transit country for gas flows from Central Asia, the Caucasus, or even East Mediterranean.

Despite political divergences, energy—by nature—tends to transcend ideological barriers, particularly in a world where energy security is becoming increasingly intertwined with foreign policy.

Therefore, India must monitor Turkey’s gas infrastructure and export ambitions, particularly with Europe’s pivot away from Russian gas, track regional energy alliances, such as Turkey’s growing cooperation with Azerbaijan (through TANAP pipeline) or renewed ties with Gulf states like the UAE and Saudi Arabia, actor in the impact of new LNG supply hubs on global spot pricing, shipping routes, and supply chain flexibility and weigh the possibility of backdoor commercial cooperation, via multilateral arrangements or private energy traders, even when direct political ties remain strained.

Summing Up:

Turkey’s discovery of 75 bcm of gas in the Black Sea is not just a headline—it’s a harbinger of a new energy order. It may solidify Ankara’s place as an emerging energy power, challenge traditional suppliers, and reshape dynamics from Europe to West Asia.

For India, a country on the cusp of an energy transition, this is a moment to observe carefully and act wisely. Whether as a competitor, collaborator, or strategic observer—India must be prepared for a multipolar, energy-driven geopolitical landscape in which Turkey may play an increasingly central role. At present there is no doubt that Turkey’s energy ascent and India’s energy needs lie on parallel yet non-intersecting tracks. But in a rapidly changing global energy order shaped by realpolitik, not rhetoric, even adversarial relations can give way to pragmatic engagements. India must watch closely how Turkey’s energy leverage evolves, particularly within the broader framework of Middle East-Europe energy corridors, and plan accordingly.

Dr. Asif Nawaz

Assistant Professor

Hamdard Institute of International Studies, Jamia Hamdard, New Delhi

draasifnawaz@gmail.com

+91 9013228794